Toward a model of consciousness: philosophical problems and questions guiding a way forward

Abstract

In spite of millennia of introspection, research and debate, there is still no compelling evidence for any single model of consciousness (Dehaene & Changeux 2011). Nor is there agreement on how to define consciousness, what constitutes a rigorous model of consciousness, and what research methods are most appropriate or productive when investigating consciousness. Current science relies on biological models of brain function as metaphors for describing what consciousness does and cannot confirm postulated causal relationships between discrete functional brain states and specific characteristics or subjective “states” of consciousness. The absence of a strong conceptual framework for thinking about consciousness, together with intrinsic limitations of contemporary research methods and technologies, have resulted in numerous un-testable hypotheses concerning the general nature of consciousness and a paralyzing lack of consensus on research priorities and methods , despite the fact that “mind” and “brain” have supplanted genetics as the next great scientific challenge for the international community -see the Human Brain Project in the EU and the BRAIN Initiative in the US (http://www.nih.gov/science/brain).With the above circumstances in view the principal goal of this paper is to clearly describe and concisely review philosophical problems and questions that are important to consider when developing models and research methods pertaining to consciousness. Topics covered include the roles and limitations of paradigms in science and other epistemologies, the relevance of different levels of analysis for investigating natural phenomena including the special case of consciousness, and different understandings of causality. The integral relationship between the nature of consciousness and the ‘background’ structure of space-time is discussed. A concise review of strengths and limitations of popular models of consciousness shows that current scientific models are based on naïve materialist assumptions that cannot potentially explain all functional characteristics or states of consciousness. The concepts of ‘body-brain’ and ‘embodiment’ are explored with respect to consciousness. I argue that a complete systems model of consciousness cannot be attained in the context of current science using existing research methods and technologies - however limited models of consciousness are possible. The evidence for so-called ‘non-ordinary’ characteristics or subjective states of consciousness including claims of psychic functioning is briefly reviewed and conceptual problems pertaining to deriving models of Psi are discussed. The paper concludes with questions aimed at reconciling contemporary models of consciousness with models that purport to explain so-called 'non-ordinary' states of consciousness, including claims of psychic functioning.